Below you’ll find my report on the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Türkiye, prepared for the 2026 budget deliberations of the Committee on Plan and Budget.
Naturally, there are countless ways to oppose and critique the government’s policies. Some may approach it from a more socialist standpoint, emphasizing income distribution, public welfare, and workers’ rights. Others, like EMEP’s MP Sevda Karaca, may interpret the same issues through a colonialist lens—focusing on dependency, resource exploitation, and foreign concessions.
As an advisor, it’s equally important to align with the party’s public policies and rhetoric, ensuring that our critiques are both principled and consistent with our broader political vision.
This is my take. It’s not the only way to look at it, but it’s an honest, data-driven assessment of where the Ministry stands, what the numbers reveal, what the policies imply, and how all of it shapes both the everyday lives of citizens and Türkiye’s long-term future in energy and natural resources.
General Assessment of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources Budget
The Ministry’s 2026 budget decreased by 20.37% from 45 billion TL to 36 billion TL compared to the previous year. This indicates a significant contraction with regard to energy supply security, mining policies and renewable transition targets. With the rise of AI and demand for semiconductors, demand for rare earth elements has also increased. Rare earths matter not only for chips, but also for space, information technologies, and defense. High-tech states strive to secure as much access to rare earths as possible to avoid supply chain disruptions.
The Government instrumentalizes energy and natural resources security and foreign dependency to gain legitimacy and political maneuvering in the international arena—pressing every button to stay in power. While the global role of energy and natural resources grows, the shrinking ministry budget shows that the “domestic and national energy” narrative has been hollowed out.
Despite a 35% drop in goods and services purchases, the sharp increases in capital expenditures (+156.6%) and capital transfers (+53.4%) show a tilt from operational services toward investment and capital-heavy structure. Meanwhile, employer social contributions (+33.0%) and personnel spending (+31.9%) are near inflation, implying no real improvement in staff compensation.
In sum, the 2026 budget prioritizes investment and capital spending but reflects an imbalanced expansion in terms of service quality and institutional human resources.
In my analysis, I briefly focused on the structure, growth, and composition of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources’ 2026 budget, examining its overall balance between operational and investment-oriented spending.
On Losses in Electricity Transmission and Distribution
Türkiye’s high transmission and distribution losses pose serious challenges not only for energy supply security but also for public resource efficiency. According to TEİAŞ 2022 data, Türkiye ranks 4th among OECD countries with the highest loss rates. While the OECD average is 5.6%, Türkiye’s loss rate is 9.2%—about 64% higher than the OECD average. In other words, about 9 of every 100 units of electricity produced are lost before reaching consumers.
World Bank data for 2023 paint a similar picture: Türkiye’s loss rate is 9%, vs. ~6% globally and in the EU. Türkiye’s total energy supply in 2023 was 6,592,863 terajoules (TJ); the implied losses (~593,358 TJ) exceed Ireland’s 2023 energy supply (536,993 TJ). In short, Türkiye is throwing away, via losses, more energy than an EU country’s annual supply—directly threatening supply security.
Because of these losses, Türkiye must generate more power to meet demand. This translates into higher bills for citizens, loss of industrial competitiveness, and a multi-billion-lira burden on the public budget. Extra generation implies more imported fuels, a hit to the budget and trade balance, and higher carbon emissions—evidence of structural governance failures that systematically waste public resources.
Thus, over 23 years of AK Party rule, Türkiye could not bring transmission and distribution losses down to world/EU averages. At the program level, “Energy Supply Security, Efficiency and Energy Market” has a 4.08% share—about one twenty-fifth of the ministry budget—underscoring that resource prioritization follows political choices rather than technical needs.
EPDK Decision – On the 2026 Electricity Tariff Regulation
By EPDK Board Decision dated 30 October 2025, the annual 5,000 kWh cap for households under the “Last Resort Supply Tariff” was reduced to 4,000 kWh, effective 1 January 2026. Though EPDK stated that roughly 2.5 millionhousehold subscribers (~6% of all households) would be affected, it is evident that the decision penalizes environmentally conscious citizens who reduce carbon emissions by charging their EVs at home.
This runs counter to President Erdoğan’s COP28 statement in Dubai that “we envisage achieving net-zero emissions by 2053.” Now, citizens charging EVs at home are considered “high-consumption” users—at odds with climate policy. While touting a “green transition,” the financial burden is shifted to citizens.
The decision also contradicts the government’s own “domestic and national” policies. The proudly introduced domestic EV Togg is electric; yet under the new tariff, a Togg owner charging at home will be treated like a commercial user—punished for choosing Togg.
In short, Türkiye has lost its integrative policy-making capacity: energy, industry, transport, and environment policies proceed in divergent directions. One state body tells citizens to buy EVs; another implies that charging them is a luxury. This lack of planning and coordination accelerates energy poverty rather than the green transition.
On the Inspections of Electricity Distribution Companies
The major forest fires in İzmir in summer 2025—affecting an estimated 26,260 to 30,000 hectares—were not only natural disasters but also indicators of lax oversight and decay in public administration. Governor Süleyman Elban stated that many fires in İzmir districts originated from power lines, drawing scrutiny to distribution companies and the Ministry’s oversight. To protect profitability, deferred infrastructure renewal and maintenance inflicted heavy losses on forest villagers, farmers, herders, and tourism businesses—yet companies and the Ministry evade accountability.
Due to negligence, on 12 July 2024 in İzmir, medical student Özge Ceren Deniz and İnanç Öktemay, who tried to help her, lost their lives after being electrocuted during heavy rain. Uninsulated cables in contact with rainwater have become an ordinary urban sight—evidence of an institutional corruption and inspection crisis, not a mere malfunction.
Average Interruption Duration Indicator – SAIDI (OKSÜRE)
Türkiye’s 2024 population is 85,664,994 (TÜİK). Elder reports 50,692,800 consumers in 2024. According to Elder’s 2024 Electricity Distribution Sector Report, excluding AKEDAŞ (for force-majeure data gaps due to the Feb 6 earthquakes), the average subscriber was without power 2,009.5 minutes per year—about 33.5 hours (1.4 days).
(Company-by-company minutes are listed in the original; omitted here for brevity in this translation request, but available upon need.)
Only in the first four months of 2025, payments amounted to ₺10,374,869,112.69—82% of the total—roughly 13% higher than the same period last year (in terms of the “Total Eligible for Payment” ratio). Despite hefty payments to distribution companies for lit streets, lax oversight leaves Türkiye’s effectively without power for ~1.5 days per year, harming the economy. A handful of distribution companies, with a predatory capitalist approach, have recklessly threatened both nature and human life—this is the so-called “AK Party century,” and the “Türkiye’s Century” will be remembered for such events.
On the Privatization of the Çayırhan Thermal Power Plant
The privatization tender held by the Privatization Administration closed on March 4, 2025; the plant was sold for ₺20 billion to Akçadağ İnşaat Enerji Madencilik A.Ş. The sale became official in the Official Gazette on May 21, 2025. The tender covers the plant’s coal field, land, buildings, and housing. Mining operating rights are transferred until 2060. The winner will pay 20% upfront; the remainder in annual installments over 72 months, indexed to inflation.
While the government speaks of “zero emissions,” “green transition,” and “2053 net-zero vision,” it ignores public interest by privatizing fossil-fuel plants—disposing of public assets under the guise of “efficiency” and selling them under value and on installment. This exemplifies the loss of capacity for long-term, objective policy-making over 23 years of AK Party rule.
Our Citizens Are Struggling to Heat Their Homes
According to Eurostat 2024, 15.1% of Türkiye’s population—12,934,414 people (roughly 1 in 7)—struggled to heat their homes. This number exceeds the populations of EU members Belgium (11,817,096), Czechia (10,900,555), and Portugal (10,639,726). The EU-27 average is 9.2%, meaning Türkiye’s ratio is about 64% higher. In absolute numbers, Türkiye has the most people struggling to heat their homes.
This is the “AK Party century”—the century of energy poverty, where retirees, children, students, and families cannot heat their homes. It is not the “Türkiye’s Century,” but the century of cold houses and frozen hands.
One Hand Hunts for Gold in Niger, the Other Sells Concessions in Türkiye
At DEİK’s Türkiye–Africa Business and Economy Forum “Energy and Mining” panel on October 17, 2025, Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced that gold production in Niger would begin soon and that local employment would be created. Meanwhile, a Canadian gold company’s destruction in Mount Ida (Kazdağları) drew public ire. While Türkiye cannot extract its own mines and outsources to foreigners, producing gold in Niger is contradictory and wounds public conscience.
While searching for gold in Niger, the government turns a blind eye to a Canadian company riddling Kazdağları—emptying the “domestic and national” discourse of credibility. Priorities are mis-set: political prestige over public interest, short-term gains over environmental sustainability. Mining policy is used as a foreign policy showcase rather than to boost industry and employment at home. Niger’s gold will not put bread on the table of Türkiye’s unemployed youth. The prioritization and allocation of public spending are clearly problematic.
The “Capitulations” Intended to Be Granted to the United Arab Emirates
The Strategic Partnership Framework Agreement in Energy and Natural Resources signed with the UAE on July 19, 2023 effectively leaves our energy independence to the UAE under the guise of “investment and cooperation.” The main committee is Foreign Affairs; the secondary committee is the Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology Committee. Yet under the Presidential System, bills pass without deliberation in secondary committees, leaving the Ministry’s opinion unknown. The bill’s status is “in committee.”
Per Article 3, rival projects will not be allowed; designated areas will be closed to other investors for 18 months; permits, licenses, and EIA processes will be facilitated. In case of disputes, Article 7 envisages resolution via “consultation and/or negotiations.” The agreement will be in force 10 years if passed.
On paper it claims to boost “mutual investments,” but in practice it endangers Türkiye’s energy independence by prioritizing UAE national interests in our strategic energy fields—more like capitulations under financial duress than an agreement between equals. It symbolizes the exhaustion of 23 years of AK Party rule—turning to Gulf capital due to depleted budgets and reserves—quietly handing over infrastructure, underground resources, storage, and transmission fields for short-term foreign currency inflows.
“Domestic and National Natural Gas” Ended When the Election Ended; “HELLO TO AMERICAN GAS”
During the election, Black Sea gas was touted as a “domestic and national energy revolution”—promising freedom from dependency, cheap and secure energy, and even zeroed bills. Today, that narrative is exposed as election-timed propaganda, divorced from economic and strategic reality. Domestic gas output remains limited; no meaningful relief in consumption; citizens still face rising bills. Despite the independence rhetoric, the government quickly moved to long-term US natural gas import deals—laying bare the emptiness of the independence claim.
The domestic gas became a political communication tool; after the polls, it was shelved. Dependency did not end; its address merely changed—to American LNG. Notably, via Mercuria–BOTAŞ, a deal for 70 bcm over 20 years from the USA was signed. This duplicity—independence slogans alongside new import contracts imposing long-term obligations—misled the public.
If domestic gas was strong enough to change our energy fate, why rush to US gas contracts? If domestic output was insufficient, why deliver “full independence” speeches?
Citizens were told “we are strong with our own gas,” but kitchens saw higher bills, with no lasting social support—only a temporary election-period gesture. The key questions now:
Where did energy independence go?
Where is the domestic gas?
Why import US gas while having our own?
Domestic resources were turned into a political showcase. What Türkiye’s needs is not election-season energy projects, but a sustainable, transparent, public-interest-driven energy policy felt as real prosperity in citizens’ pockets.
A Social State Does Not Put Makeup on Poverty; It Ends It
“State support” items on electricity and gas bills are not genuine social policy but perception management. The state has made citizens dependent on their own money due to heavy taxes, high energy costs, and flawed economic policy—presenting bill items as a “favor.” In reality, citizens finance themselves through their taxes.
A social state should empower citizens without impoverishing them. It manages to eliminate poverty, not manage it. Election-season rhetoric about free or discounted energy merely concealed years of high bills. If resources were managed well, production increased, and capacity strengthened, citizens would not need to see “state support” on their bills. The current approach reflects authoritarian populism—expecting gratitude by indebting the public—contrary to citizens’ dignity.
Our understanding:
The state does not hand out alms; it delivers rights.
The state lets citizens live with dignity, not gratitude.
A social state does not put makeup on poverty; it ends it.
We therefore reject the regulation and communication strategy and demand genuine social-state practices.
The Election Is Over; the Free Natural Gas Support Is Over
Marketed as a permanent boost to welfare, the “free natural gas” was in fact only one month of zero bills plus 25 m³ per month covered for one year—a temporary and timed practice with clear political aims. It ended on May 1, 2024.
The gap between public perception and actual practice was stark. Promises of independence and cheap domestic energy became an election tactic. The support did not shield vulnerable citizens; it offered a brief respite, after which the economic pressure returned heavier. Moreover, it lacked means-testing, dispersing public funds outside the targeted, fair framework essential to social policy.
Ultimately, this was part of an election campaign, not an institutional responsibility of the social state. True social policy does not impoverish citizens and then announce support; it builds permanent, equitable systems enabling all to live in prosperity.
Assessment of Akkuyu Nuclear Plant and TENMAK Performance Indicators
While the Nuclear Regulatory Authority claims to oversee Akkuyu NPP, TENMAK’s 2024 activity report shows that alleged work is not backed by a comprehensive, strategy-aligned, knowledge-producing nuclear policy. Under the “Energy Supply Security, Efficiency and Energy Market” program, the “Radioactive Waste Management” sub-program targets boosting infrastructure and capacity. Yet the critical indicator “Number of scientific publications on radioactive waste” had a target of 2, with 0 achieved—unacceptable for such a high-risk field.
International practice relies on scientific publications and peer-reviewed research; Türkiye sets symbolic targets ignoring global quality metrics and fails even to meet them—indicating a serious capacity gap in nuclear energy, which is also a national security concern.
In my analysis, I briefly focused on the performance indicators, evaluating their targets, results, and achievement rates to assess overall institutional effectiveness.
If further details or clarification are needed, please feel free to contact me.
Separately:
2018: Akkuyu NPP foundation laid.
2022: Russia terminated EPC contract on July 26; on July 30, it announced continuation with a company formed by three Russian partners.
2024: Minister Bayraktar said the first reactor would enter service in 2025.
2026 Presidential Annual Program states the first unit is planned to be commissioned in 2026.
Given the stakes—where even minor mishaps threaten millions—this lack of statecraft and planning capability inspires fear among friends and confidence among adversaries.
“Russian-Capital” Akkuyu Plant
Long-standing questions persist:
The project runs with 100% Russian capital.
Dependence on Russia is institutionalized for nuclear fuel logistics, waste management, and maintenance.
There are unaddressed claims of FX-denominated purchase guarantees for a long share of produced electricity.
Worker safety and conditions have repeatedly raised concerns, including fatal accidents.
2023 construction incidents, concrete pouring defects, and crack allegations triggered serious reliability debates.
Thus, despite being marketed as a symbol of national energy independence, Akkuyu in practice creates strategic dependence on Russia—projecting a country reliant on foreign technology, failing to produce knowledge, and unable to manage strategic risks.
Persistence in Error: Permanent Daylight Saving Time
Permanent DST began in 2016 during Berat Albayrak’s tenure as Energy Minister, increasing Türkiye’s time difference with Europe (2 hours with Central Europe, 3 with the UK). Claimed energy savings have instead produced broad social grievances: commuting in darkness, safety concerns (especially for children and women), and disruptions to sleep, circadian rhythm, cognition, attention, and productivity—raising risks of metabolic, cardiovascular, psychiatric, and neurodegenerative issues, and increasing workplace/traffic accidents.
Minister Bayraktar claimed 11.252 billion kWh saved between 2016–2024 (≈₺20 billion), but the underlying report was not shared and has been deemed methodologically unrealistic by academia and professional bodies.
We reject a policy that sacrifices public welfare, health, and safety under the pretext of energy savings. Our proposal last year to abolish permanent DST and return to seasonal time—envisaging an additional ₺5 billion allocation—was rejected by the AK Party and MHP. Any administration claiming to protect public resources and follow scientific facts must end this arrangement; otherwise, it will remain a symbol of the country’s distance from reason and science. As last year, we emphasize that this mistake must be corrected this year as well.